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The case of Wong Wing et al. v. U. S., 16 Sup. Court Rep.
977, presents an interesting and important feature of the Chinese
Exclusion Act, as construed by the Supreme Court on the follow-
ing facts: Three Chinese persons, the appellants in this case,
were brought before the commissioner of the U. S. Circuit Court
for the district of Michigan upon a charge of being Chinese per-
sons unlawfully within the United States, and not entitled to re-
main within the same, and, on proof of the charge against them,
the commissioner directed that they be imprisoned at hard labor
for sixty days, and that at the expiration of that time they be
removed from the United States to China. On appeal from the
Circuit Court, Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion and based
his decision upon the fourth section of the Chinese Act of 1892,
which provides as follows : "Any Chinese person, or person of
Chinese descent, convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled
to be or remain in the United States, shall be imprisoned at hard
labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed
from the United States." The case turned upon the question of
"due process of law," under the well-known provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the evident mean-
ing of the above Act is that imprisonment at hard labor shall be
undergone before the sentence of deportation is to be carried into
effect; and that such imprisonment is to be adjudged against the
accused by a justice, judge, or commissioner upon a summary pro-
ceeding; and it is upon this last statement that the court seems to
base its decision, for it concludes by saying that when Congress
sees fit to promote public policy by subjecting the persons of
aliens to infamous punishment, or by confiscating their property,
such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to
establish the guilt of the accused, and in accordance with this
opinion the judgment of the circuit court was reversed.
The law regarding foreign judgments is clearly stated in a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the
opinion by Judge Baldwin in the case of Fisher et al v. Fielding, 34
Atl. Rep. 714. The defendant, a citizen of Connecticut, was
served with process while transiently stopping at a hotel in
Birmingham, England, and as he was about to take his departure
for home. He failed to appear and judgment went against him
by default in the English court. An action was brought on the
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judgment in Connecticut, and the defendant set up a special plea
to the Jurisdiction of the foreign court. The Connecticut Supreme
Court held that "the fact that the defendant was a foreigner,
making but a brief stay in the country, and on the point of leaving
it for his own, did not deprive the courts of England of all juris-
diction over him. He accepted the forum when he voluntarily
placed himself on English soil, and so came under an implied
obligation to respect such legal process as might be served upon
'him there, to the extent of satisfying any resulting judgment duly
rendered for a pecuniary demand." And they also held that "no
one who has been, or could have been, heard upon a disputed
claim, in a cause to which he was duly made a party, pending
before a competent judicial tribunal, having jurisdiction over him,
proceeding in due course of justice, and not misled by the fraud
of the other party, should be allowed after a final judgment has
been pronounced, to renew the contest in another country." The
question was also raised as to how far a foreign judgment for a
sum of money, rendered against one of our citizens, should be
held conclusive in a suit brought for its collection. The cases of
Abouloff v. Opj.enheimer, io Q. B. Div. 295, 302, and Vadalav. Ldwes,
25 Q. B. Div. 310, 36, 39, state the English rule to be that the
defendant cannot go into the merits of the original cause of
action, which were treated in the foreign court, unless it be neces-
sary to support a claim that the judgment was obtained by fraud.
In such a case, the merits may be retried, not to show that the
foreign court came to a wrong conclusion, but that it was fraudu-
lently misled into coming to a wrong conclusion, and if the triers
are convinced that the foreign judgment should have been
rendered, on the merits the other way, but still do not find that
there was fraud, the defense fails. Following this doctrine, the
Connecticut Court held that the judgment in suit was conclusive
as to the merits of the cause of action, and should be enforced.
The Supreme Court of the United States have recently held that
the effect to be given to a foreign judgment in personam, for a
money demand, must be determined either by the comity of
nations, the rule of absolute reciprocity, or the personal obligation
resting upon the defendant. Turning upon the question of reci-
procity, in the case of Hilon v. Guyot, 159 U. S. I13, 16 Sup. Ct.
139, they decided that the judgment of a court of France was not
conclusive in the United States. The Connecticut Supreme Court
neither criticized nor approved the doctrine of ilton v. Guyot, but
held that "whichever test may be adopted, the result would be
the same where the question arises between the courts of England
and those of an American state which was once an English colony."
